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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
The only issue presented on appeal is:

was the

warrantless frisk of the appellant based on a constitutionally
adequate, reasonable suspicion that the appellant was armed and
dangerous?
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent
v.

:

ORLANDO F. ROYBAL,

:

Case No. 2 0560

Defendant-Appellant
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The appellant, Orlando Roybal, appeals from a conviction
and judgment imposed for Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a
Restricted Person, a felony of the second degree in violation of
Utah Code Ann. §76-10-503 (1953 as amended), in the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge, presiding on February 15,
1985.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
At approximately 2:00 a.m. on May 21, 1984, the sheriff's
office responded to a dispatch of a "family disturbance and shots
being fired" at 3287 South 145 East, Salt Lake City, Utah which was
the address of Orlando Roybal.

(T. 70-71)

The officers responding

to the dispatch were met at the door by the owner of the apartment,
Mr. Roybal.

(T. 71)

Mr. Roybal related to the officers that two

individuals had attempted to break into his apartment and during
the process shot holes in his window.

(Id.)

The officers nevertheles
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arrested Mr. Roybal and after searching his person and home for
weapons, with negative results, booked him into the Salt Lake
County Jail.
pre-trial

(T. 72) Within a few hours Mr. Roybal was released on

supervision and borrowed his sisterfs car to drive back

out to his apartment.

(T. 72)

At about 9:00 a.m. on May 21, 1984 the sherifffs dispatch
received a second complaint from

Mr. Roybalfs address.

(T. 5-6)

This complaint was dispatched on the police radio as a "suspicious
vehicle" with Orlando Roybal as the complainant.

(T. 6-7)

Officer

Robert Mitchell was one of the officers that responded to this
second dispatch.

At the time Officer Mitchell responded to the

9:00 a.m. "suspicious vehicle" complaint by Mr. Roybal he had been
informed by another officer of the earlier incident at Mr. Roybalfs
address.

(T.7)

It had been reported to him as a

{family disturbance

with shots being fired," with Mr. Roybal being arrested and no
weapons recovered.

(T. 7-8)

It was also reported to Officer

Mitchell that Orlando Roybal was at that moment still in the Salt
Lake County Jail.

(T. 9)

When Officer Mitchell arrived at the scene, he parked his *
patrol car and was waiting for other officers to arrive when he
observed a Mexican-American, later identified as Orlando Roybal,
walking toward his patrol car from the north end of the apartment
about 50 yards away.

(T. 15-16, 23)

As Mr. Roybal approached the

driver's side of the patrol car, he acknowledged who he was and
Officer Mitchell patted him down and recovered a gun.

-2- J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(T. 18, 104)

Third District Judge Homer F. Wilkinson heard the case in a
bench trial on August 29, 1984.

At the close of testimony, the

court gave the defense and the State the opportunity to submit
written arguments on defendant's Motion to Suppress the fruits of
the pat-down search conducted by Officer Mitchell (Addendums A and
B).

The Motion to Suppress was denied by Judge Wilkinson on

October 29, 1984 (See Addendum C ) .

On December 10, 1984 the court

entered a verdict of guilty arid ordered a presentece report be
prepared. On February 15, 1985 the court sentenced Mr. Roybal to an
indeterminate term of from one to fifteen years at the Utah State
Prison and a fine of $10,000.00.

The court stayed the execution of

the prison sentence and fine and placed Mr. Roybal on probation for
18 months, fined him $1,000.00, and required 450 hours of community
service.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The appellant argues on appeal that the warrantless
"frisk" search of him by Officer Robert Mitchell violated the
appellant's right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.
The frisk was based entirely on information, much of which was
erroneous, received by officer Mitchell from other police officers
regarding an incident reported by the appellant early that morning.
The testimony of officers Mitchell and Baird, as well as the
testimony of the appellant are in agreement that:

(1) the

Appellant was not observed violating any laws, (2) the appellant
did not make any furtive or suspicious movements or gestures, (3)
Officer Mitchell never felt that his life was endangered by the
appellant.

Therefore, the warrantless frisk of the Appellant was

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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unreasonable and the trial court erred in refusing to grant the
appellant's motion to suppress,
ARGUMENT
THE PAT-DOWN SEARCH OF THE APPELLANT WAS IN VIOLATION
OF HIS RIGHT TO REMAIN FREE FROM UNREASONABLE SEARCH
AND SEIZURE.
Prior to trial, defense counsel filed a motion to suppress
the evidence obtained from the pat-down search of the defendant,
Orlando Roybal.

The defense did not contest Mr. Roybal!s

possession of the firearm nor was the defendant's status as a
restricted person contested.

Howeverf the evidence resulting from

the search of the defendant should have been suppressed because the
searching officer did not have constitutionally adequate,
reasonable grounds for the warrantless search of Mr. Roybal, thus
violating his fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable
search and seizure.

United States Constitution, Amendment IV.

Utah Constitution, Article I Section 14.
With only a few specifically established exceptions,
"searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior
approval of judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment."

Katy v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).

The burden is on the state to show the warrantless search came
within one of the established exceptions.
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).

Coolidqe v. New

(See State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175

(Utah 1983) listing the exceptions to the warrant requirement).
the present case it is the "stop and frisk" exception articulated
by the United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968) which is relied on by the state to justify the warrantless
search.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In

In Terryf supra, and its companion case Sibron v. New York,
392 U.S. 40 (1968), the United States Supreme Court attempted to
define the acceptable limits of the universal police practice known
as "stop and frisk", which is the practice whereby officers stop
suspicious individuals for questioning and, occasionally, search such
persons for dangerous weapons.

The court, in Terry, considered in some

detail the "frisk" component of the "stop-and-frisk" procedure.
The court concluded that a "frisk" is indeed a "search" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

The court then held that a frisk

could only be performed by an investigating officer in a search for
weapons which could be used against the officer or others in the
immediate vicinity.

Further, the court found that "in justifying

the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point
to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that
intrusion."

Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.

The court did not require an

officer to establish that it was more likely than not that a
suspect was armed and dangerous, but "only that there was a
substantial possibility that the suspect possessed items which
could be used for an attack and that he would so use them."
LaFave, Search and Seizure 114 (1978).

3

Clearly, then, some quantum

of evidence must be presented that a suspect is armed and dangerous
before an officer can initiate a frisk.

"A police officer is not

entitled to search every person he sees on the street or of whom he
makes inquiries.

Before he places a hand on the person of a

citizen in search of anything, he must have constitutionally
adequate, reasonable grounds for doing so."

Sibron 392 U.S. at 64.
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Justice Harlan, agreeing with the reasoning and holding of the
Court, wrote a thoughtful concurrence in Terry, supra, to
elaborate on

the reasonableness requirement of frisks.

Not only

must the frisk be based on specific and articulable facts to
justify the intrusion, the police officer must have constitutional
grounds to insist on the initial encouter out of which the frisk
arises.

Terry, 392 U.S. at 32-33.

Therefore a frisk can only be

justified if the.facts of the situation justify an initial stop or
the initial detainment.

This reasoning is applicable even where,

as in the case at bar, the defendant voluntarily stops to talk to
the police officer but is then detained and frisked.

The forced

search of the detainee requires the curtailment of his liberty to
leave at any time and therefore the officer, taking into account
the words and actions of the approaching person, must have
constitutionally adequate reasonable grounds to detain that
person, before a frisk can even arguably be proper.
Applying Terry to the case at bar, it is clear that only
if the actions and words of the appellant, Orlando Roybal, created
a reasonable suspicion that Roybal was involved in a criminal
activity would Officer Mitchell be justified in detaining Roybal.
If the detainment was proper, there still had to have been
specific and articulable facts which would reasonably lead an
officer to believe that his life or others lives were endangered
before a frisk would be proper.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979) the police, armed
with a search warrant to search a tavern and its bartender for
drugs performed pat down searches of the patrons of the tavern.
Ybarra, a patron in the tavern, was frisked, and found to be
holding a tin foil pouch containing heroin.

The United States

Supreme Court held that the police did not have specific and
articulable facts justifying a reasonable suspicion that Ybarra
posed a threat to anybody's life, and therefore the frisk was
improper.

The court found that:

[U]pon entering the tavern, the police did not
recognize Ybarra and had no reason to believe
that he had committed, was committing, or was
about to commit any offense under state of
federal law. Ybarra made no gestures indicative
of criminal conduct, made no movements that
might suggest an attempt to conceal contraband,
and said nothing of a suspicious nature to the
police officers. In short, the agents knew
nothing in particular about Ybarra. . . (Id. at
90-91).
The court concluded that "[t]he initial frisk of Ybarra was simply
not supported by a reasonable belief that he was armed and
presently dangerous, a belief which this Court has invariably held
must form the predicate to a pat-down of a person for weapons."
Id. at 92-93 (emphasis added).
In the case at bar the appellant contends that the frisk
by Officer Mitchell far exceeded the constitutional limits set in
Terry, Sibron, and Ybarra, supra, as well as the Utah statutory
stop and frisk provisions, Utah Code Ann. §§77-7-15 and 77-7-16
(1953 as amended).

The appellant was not stopped as a suspicious

person; but voluntarily approached the sheriff's patrol car after
he had personally called the sheriff's department to report a
suspicious vehicle parked in front of his apartment.

Officer

by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Mitchell Digitized
testified
that he saw the appellant walk towards him
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

from fifty yards away, and therefore he had a clear opportunity
to observe the appellant.

Yet there was no evidence that Mr.

Roybal made any furtive movements or gestures or remarks so as to
justify the weapons search.

(T. 16-18).

There was no suspicious

conduct observed by Officer Mitchell to justify the detainment of
the appellant in order to search him.

(Idk ) But even if there

had been, some suspicious conduct on the part of the appellant
justifying further detainment and questioning, there was no
evidence presented that officer Mitchell observed anything
objectively indicating that the appellant was armed and presently
dnagerous, as required in Terry, Sibron, and Ybarra.

This fact

was made clear in the following question and answer exchange
between defense counsel and officer Mitchell:
Q: He didn't do anything that indicated that he was
going to do any violence toward you, did he? Did he
make any moves or anything that made it indicate to
you that he was going to do any violence toward you?
A:

No.

(T. 23)

Furthermore, Officer Mitchell testified that at the time he frisked
Mr. Roybal, he did not know that the man was Mr. Roybal (T.
24,25,41), and he testified that the search was based on a "sixth
sense" hunch (T. 28). Therefore, any explanation of the search
advanced by the state is simply not supported by the testimony of
the searching officer, Officer Mitchell.
The state may argue that Officer Mitchell was justified in
detaining and searching the appellant because of the information
that he had received from another officer that shots had been

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
-8-may contain errors.
Machine-generated OCR,

fired the night before outside the appellant's residence and the
erroneous information that the appellant was still in jail.

But

this argument is without merit because Officer Mitchell had no
idea that the man was Orlando Roybal before frisking him.

The

court made clear in Terry v. Ohio, that an investigative stop or
detention predicated on rumor or hunch is unlawful, even though
the officer may be acting in complete good faith.

The subjective

good faith of the officer is not enough, the detainment and search
must be objectively reasonable.

392 U.S. at 22.

In the present case any suspicion on the part of Officer
Mitchell could only have

been based on the partially erroneous

information given to him by another officer.

There ws no conduct

on the part of the appellant to corroborate Officer Mitchell's
suspicions, and Officer Mitchell made no inquiries of the
appellant before searching him.

(T. 18)

It is clear that the

fact that there had been guns fired at the address earlier was not
sufficient cause to search a person merely because he was in the
area of the crime.

(See State v. Swanigan, No. 19320 (Utah, March

28, 1985) holding that the defendant's proximity to the crime,
without any showing of suspicious actions on the part of the
defendant, does not justify a warrantless "stop and frisk").
Without some suspicious actions on the part of the appellant, the
detainment and frisk for weapons of the appellant was merely based
on hunch, and therefore objectively unreasonable.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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CONCLUSION
Because the warrantless frisk of Orlando Roybal was not based
on a constitutionally reasonable suspicion the motion to suppress
the gun should have been granted, and the trial court's refusal to
do so constituted reversible error.

The state would have had

insufficient evidence to support the conviction of possession of a
weapon by a restricted person if the gun had been suppressed, as
it should have been.

Therefore, the appellant requests that this

court reverse his conviction and order that a verdict and
judgment of acquittal be entered.

Alternatively, if this court

feels that, even after excluding the weapon, the state still
presented evidence which could be sufficient to base a conviction
of possession of a weapon by a restricted person, the case should
be remanded for a new trial.
DATED this

day of August, 1985.

LYNN R. BROWN
Attorney for Defendant
I, LYNN R. BROWN, hereby certify that four copies of the
foregoing Appellant's brief will be delivered to the Attorney
General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah
84114, this

day of August, 1985.
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DELIVERED by

, this

day of August, 1985.
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MR. BROWN:

That is all the witnesses.

THE COURT: Any rebuttal?
MR. D'ELIA:

1

THii COURT:

No, Your Honor.
Gentlemen, do you wish to

argue Che case today or do you wish to submit it on written
briefs?

MR. BROWN:

No, Your Honor.

As I

indicated to the Court "[ would like to submit a memorandum
to the Court on the two issues I think that are involved
in this case.

Submit it to the Court.

I think I could have

a memorandum to the Court within a week from Friday.

THE COURT: A week from Friday.
would be the 31st.

That

Then it would be the—Graver, you've

got to get rid of your old calendar about now.

The 7th of

September, is that right?

MR. BROWN:

What is the date?

THE COURT: As I read it, from what you
say, a week from Friday would be the 7th of September.

THE BAILIFF: The 7th.
MR. BROWN:

September 7.

THE COURT: Yes.
MR. D'ELIA:

Your Honor, how long would

you give the State?

THE COURT: How long do you need?
MR. D'ELIA:

Fourteen days.

ALAN P. SMITH, CSR
385 BRAHMA DRIVE 84107 RES. 266-0320
COURTS BLDG 2-C E 4 S (801)535-7372
231 JUDGE B U U D J N G OFF 533-0800
HunterSALT
LawLAKE
Library,
Reuben
Clark Law
riTY,J.UTAH
84111
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maximum.

I could probably have it in in about ten, but In

case a trial pops up or two.

T need until the 14th.

THE COURT:

Do you have any objection?

MR. BROWN:

No objection.

THE COURT:

Then you will have yours in

I

!

the 21st of September.
MR. D'ELIA:

Yes, Your Honor.

Should we

wait for a date to argue the motion, or whatever the case
may be, or are we going to decide that now?
THE COURT:

Do you want to come in and

MR. BROWN:

Well, let's--

argue it?

MR. D'ELIA:

I would be willing to submit

it on the memorandum.
MR. BROWN:
memorandums are, Your Honor.

I want to see what the
I think when I get the memorandum

I could indicate to the Court at that time.
THE COURT:

Okay,

You better after you

get hi s memorandum, get i t to me fast because I may be
deciding fast if you don't need argument.

I will want to

read them and when it is fresh.
MR. BROWN:

All right.

THE COURT:

Okay.

Thank you.

Thank you, gentlemen.

And of course, understand, Mr. Brown and Mr. Roybal, that
the question of contempt is still pending over this gentleman.

ALAN P SMITH, CSR
385 BRAHMA Dfl'VE 84107 RES 266-0320
COURTS BLDG 240 E 4 S (801) 535-7372
231 JUDGE BULDlNG OFF 533-0800
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84111
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LYNN R. BROWN
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.
Attorney for Defendant
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah
34111
Telephone:
532-5444
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH,
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff
V.

SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS

:

ORLANDO F. ROYBAL,

:

Case No. CR-84-762

Defendant

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On May 21, 1984 at about 9:00 a.m. Orlando F. Roybal
was arrested after a pat-down search by officer Robert Mitchell
revealed that Mr. Roybal was in possession of a firearm.

He was

arrested for being in possession of a firearm by a restricted
person.
The defense is not contesting the fact that Mr. Roybal
was in possession of a firearm, but contends that the firearm
was discovered by law enforcement pursuant to an illegal search
and seizure and that the possession of the firearm by Mr. Roybal
was only for the purpose to protect himself and his property.
The facts that lead up to the pat-down search are as
follows:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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At approximately 2:00 a.m. on May 21, 1984 the sheriff's
office responded to a dispatch of a "family disturbance and shots
being fired" at 3287 South 145 East, Salt Lake City, Utah which
was the address of Orlando Roybal.

The officers responding to

the dispatch were met at the door by the owner of the apartment,
Mr. Roybal.

Mr. Roybal related to the officers that two individuals

had attempted to break into his apartment and during the process
shot holes in his window.

The officers nevertheless arrested

Mr. Roybal and after searching his person and home for weapons,
with negative results, booked him into the Salt Lake County Jail.
Within a few hours Mr. Roybal was released on pre-trial supervision
and. borrowed his sister's car to drive back out to his apartment.
At about 9:00 a.m. on May 21, 1984 the sheriff1s dispatch
received a second complaint from Mr. Roybalfs address.

This complaint

was dispatched on the police radio as a "suspicious vehicle" with
Orlando Roybal as the complainant.

Officer Robert Mitchell was

one of the officers that responded to this second dispatch.

At

the time Officer Mitchell responded to the 9:00 a.m. "suspicious
vehicle" complaint by Mr. Roybal he had been informed by another
officer of the earlier incident at Mr. Roybal's address.

It had

been reported to him "family disturbance with shots being fired,"
with Mr. Roybal being arrested and no weapons recovered.

It was

also reported to Officer Mitchell that Orlando Roybal was at that
moment still in the Salt Lake County Jail.
When Officer Mitchell arrived at the scene, he parked
his patrol car and was waiting for other officers to arrive when
he observed a Mexican-American, later identified as Orlando Roybal,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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walking toward his patrol car from the north end of the apartment
about 50 yards away.

As Mr. Roybal approached the driver's side

of the patrol car, he acknowledged who he was and Officer Mitchell
patted him down and recovered a gun.
ARGUMENT
THE PAT-DOWN SEARCH OF ORLANDO FOYBAL WAS
IN VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHT TO REMAIN FREE
FROM UNREASONABLE SEARCH•AND SEIZURE.
It is generally recognized that any search conducted
outside the judicial process without prior approval by a magistrate
is presumed to be unreasonable.
P.2d 64 (1967).

State v. Kent, 20 U.2d 9, 432

The burden to "justify a warrantless search is

upon the prosecution to show that the search is within one of
judicially qualified exceptions.
U.S. 443 (1971).

Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 463

"A police officer is not entitled to search

every person he sees on the streets or when he makes inquiries.
Before he places a hand on the person of any citizen in search
of anything, he must have constitutionally adequate, reasonable
grounds for doing so."

Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64 (1968).

One of the judicially recognized exceptions to the warrantless
search is the "stop and frisk" exception articulated by the United
States Supreme Court in the case of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968).

The Terry case established the principle that a police

officer can frisk for weapons search when he has reason to believe
that such weapon could be used against the officer or others

-3Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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in the immediate vicinity.

In Utah this concept has been codified

by statute which states:
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15. Authority
of DPace officer to stop and question
suspect -- Grounds. A oeace officer
may stop any person in a public place
when he has a reasonable suspicion
to believe he has committed or is
in the act of committing or is attempting
to commit a public offense and may
demand his name, address and an explanation
of his actions.
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-16. Authority
of peace officer to frisk suspect
for dangerous weapon -- Crouds. A
oeace officer who has stopned a person
temporarily for questioning may frisk
the person for a dangerous weapon
if he reasonably believes he or any
other person is in danger.
-^n Terry, supra and its companion case, Sibron, supra,
the United States Supreme Court attempted to define the acceptable
limits of the universal police practice known as "stop-and-frisk."
"Stop-and-frisk" is a time-honored police practice whereby officers
stop suspicious individuals for questioning and, occasionally,
to search such persons for dangerous weapons.

Since, Terry courts

have routinely divided this practice into its two components
(i.e. the "stop" component and the "frisk" component) and have
examined the resonableness of each component.

In the present

case, the stop portion of the Terry analysis is not applicable
since it was Mr. Roybal that called for the assistance of the
police and upon their arrival voluntarily approached the patrol
car where officer Mitchell was standing.
The Terry court considered in some detail the. "frisk"
component of the "stop-and-frisk" procedure.

The court concluded

that a "frisk" is indeed a "search" within the meaning of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
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Fourth Amendment.

The court held that a MfriskM could only be

performed by the investigating officer in a search for weapons
which could be used against the officer or others in the immediate
vicinity.

Further, the court found that "in iustifyine theparticular

intrusion the police officer must be able to point to jy^cjjJ[ic
and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences
from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion."
21 (emphasis added).

^_d. at

The court did not require an officer to

establish that it was more likely than not that a suDsect was
armed and dangerous, but "only that there was a substantial possibility
that the suspect possessed items which could be used for an attack
and that he would so use them."
114 (1978).

3 LaFave, Search and Seizure

Still, some quantum of evidence must be present

that a suspect is armed and dangerous before an officer can initiate
a frisk.

Not every "stop" can result in a "frisk".
Starting from Terry, various courts have attempted to

identify the factors necessary for an officer to initiate a frisk
of an individual which he has stopped.

Two such cases are particularly

relevant.
• In Commonwealth v. Pegram, 301 A.2d 695 (Pa. 1973),
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the defendant's convictions
of burglary and larceny.

In that case two officers who had responded

to a burglary call noticed the defendant, Pepram, in an alley
near the scene of the burglary.
he ran away from them.

When Pegram saw the officers,

A few minutes later the officers found

Pegram and asked him to approach their vehicle, which he did
voluntarily.

After asking only the suspect's name, one of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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officers frisked. Pegram.

The search yielded a knife and Pegram

was arrested; a subsequent search of the suspect uncovered items
which had been taken in the burglary.

The Pennsylvania Court

reversed the defendant's conviction since probable cause did
not exist for Pegram1s arrest at the time of the stop.

The court

further held that the officers had no lawful justification to
-frisk Pegram, noting that while the officers did observe "unusual
conduct," "no such conduct was observed which would lead to the
conclusion that appellant was either 'armed or presently dangerous.'"
Id. at 698.
In People v. Sherman, 593 P.2d 971 (Colo. 1979), officers
of a special burglary investigation unit observed a group of
youths, including the defendant, carrying beer bottles.

After

stopping the group and requesting identification (which was produced),
the officers frisked each of the youths.

Officers testified

that the frisk was conducted as a safety measure.

The frisk

of the defendant produced a plastic bag which contained approximately
100 pills.

In affirming a lower court ruling suppressing the

evidence, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the frisk was
invalid since no rational basis was found for suspecting that
the defendant was armed.
was reasonable.

The court found that the initial stop

However, nothing in the circumstances surrounding

the stop gave the officers reason to suspect that the defendant
was armed and dangerous.
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CONCLUSION
In the present case it is the defense's contention that
the frisk by Officer Mitchell of Mr. Roybal far exceeded the limits
of Terry, Sibron and the Utah stOD and frisk provisions in Utah
Code Ann. §$77-7-15 and 77-7-16.

In this regard it should be

noted that Mr. Roybal was not even stopped as a suspicious person^
But voluntarily approached the sheriff's patrol car after he had
summoned assistance a few minutes earlier by calling the sheriff's
dispatch.

Officer Mitchell further testified that he observed

Mr. Roybal walking toward him from 50 yards away.
There was no evidence that Mr. Roybal made a-ny furtive
movements or gestures as to justify a frisk for weapons search.
There was no conduct observed by Officer Mitchell which would
lead to a reasonable belief that Mr. Roybal was armed or presently
dangerous.
The facts in the present case are very similar to facts
in Commonwealth v. Pegram, supra where the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court reversed a burelary and larceny conviction based on an illegal
frisk.
DATED this

day of September, 1984.

LYNN R. BROWN
Attorney for Defendant
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the County Attorney's
Office, 231 East Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
day of September, 1984.
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